S. Hrg. 109-311: Abel Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing

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Analysts had created charts that included pictures of then-known Al Qaeda operatives, but none including Atta.

The chart not only vindicates my findings, but defies the conclusion later reached by Fitzgerald and Dietrich Snell, his SDNY colleague (a senior counsel on the 9/11 Commission) who determined the “origin of the plot” and pushed it forward two years to Afghanistan in 1996, removing Yousef from the plot and suggesting that at the time KSM was not even a member of al Qaeda—a conclusion that is almost comical in light of the documented evidence of al Qaeda’s control of the suicide-hijack plot. There they were met by Omar al-Bayoumi a Saudi , suspected of being an intelligence officer, who had visited the Saudi consulate in L. Indeed, EO 12333 has ten provisions allowing for the retention of data including “Information that is publicly available” and “Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence . Examining Sheikh Rahman’s Brooklyn cell—which operated out of Ali Mohamed’s old stomping grounds, the al Farooq mosque—the LIWA analysts made another alarming discovery. Clearly they had criminal jurisdiction to pursue the leads as a result of Khallad’s ties to the Embassy bombing.Because by the summer of 2000 they moved into the Lemon Grove section of San Diego, renting rooms from Abdussattar Shaykh, a local Muslim leader who was also an FBI informant In fact, Shaykh was considered so important to the Bureau that he was later described as a “tested” undercover “asset. Addressing the management at FBI Headquarters, he predicted that “Someday somebody will die—and, ‘wall’ or not, the public will not understand why we were not more effective. Congressman Weldon also claims the report was a hurried, botched up investigation that was intended to close the books on the subject rather than report on the facts.

During that period al-Bayoumi helped them get settled, finding them an apartment across from where he lived. Contracted out to Raytheon’s Intelligence and Information Systems facility at Garland, Texas, several of the key LIWA data miners were brought over to do a new “harvest” of open-source material on al Qaeda.Weldon, a loyal conservative, came to believe that the suppression of intelligence on al Qaeda was a scandal that transcended political administrations, parties, and agencies. They had been outflanked by the al Qaeda spy for years, seemingly incapable of detecting his agenda when he was “fully operational. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. In fact, the LIWA/DIA data miners went even further—putting Ali Mohamed and bin Laden’s brother-in-law Mohammed-Jamal-Khalifa in the al Qaeda inner circle.

Then the LIWA people show you a link chart with a picture of this fellow Ali Mohamed so close to bin Laden. Anthony Shaffer and those of four others, Able Danger had identified 2 of 3 Al Qaeda cells active in the 9/11 attacks; the 'Brooklyn cell' linked to Blind Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, including September 11 attacks leader Mohamed Atta, and three of the 9/11 plot's other 19 hijackers, as possible members of an al Qaeda cell linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Our 4 inch prints feature a minimum half-inch margin while larger sizes feature a minimum one-inch margin. That wiretap of the home of Khalid al-Midhar’s brother-in-law led the CIA to monitor the summit in Kuala Lumpur, but even before that there is evidence that al-Midhar and al-Hazmi had entered the U.He believed that Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta 13 separate times prior to 9/11 and that the unit also identified a potential situation in Yemen two weeks prior to the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole. On the day in question when he ultimately admits to what his role was, it is Pat [Fitzgerald who] brings him up to the precipice. Congressman Curt Weldon issued a response to the 9/11 Commission [20] clarifying the mission of Able Danger, expressing concern over the statements made by various members of the 9/11 Commission, and promising to push forward until it is understood why the DoD was unable to pass the information uncovered by Able Danger to the FBI, and why the 9/11 Commission failed to follow up on the information they were given on Able Danger. The statement announced the discovery of three other witnesses in addition to Shaffer and Phillpott who confirm Able Danger had produced a chart that "either mentioned Atta by name as an al-Qaeda operative [and/or] showed his photograph. As the winter draws in, the canny mouse must endure hunger, danger, and the ever-present threat of an owl with nasty intentions.

Told to “Start with the words ‘Al Qaeda’ and go,” the LIWA data crunchers began an initial harvest in December 1999.Colonel Anthony Shaffer and the other four Able Danger employees at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in September 2005, pointed out to the Committee that his clients had been forbidden by the Pentagon to testify to the committee. To prevent two entries from occurring in NIIS, the inspector should have crossed out the admission number on the new I-94, made a reference to the previous admission number and noted that it was not a new entry. In his 1999 confession to Egyptian authorities, Ali’s Santa Clara protégé Khalid Dahab had admitted that he and Mohamed had recruited at least ten sleepers in Santa Clara alone. After 9/11 he gives inaccurate information and has an “inconclusive” polygraph examination about his foreknowledge of the 9/11 attack. After a rambling speech, the younger Rahman urged their followers to “avenge your Sheikh” and “go to the spilling of blood.